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THE CRUCIAL BUT (POTENTIALLY) 
PRECARIOUS POSITION OF THE  
CHIEF COMPLIANCE OFFICER 
Deborah A. DeMott* 
INTRODUCTION 
Although the importance of internal systems geared to ensure a firm’s 
compliance with applicable law and regulation is widely acknowledged, as 
is the visibility of major compliance failures in scandal-ridden 
financial-services firms, the roles and status of compliance personnel are 
relatively unexamined by scholars. Focusing specifically on the position of 
Chief Compliance Officer (CCO), this Article explores the functions 
performed by a CCO as well as circumstances that may strengthen or limit a 
CCO’s effectiveness, including the implications of legal doctrine and 
regulation. The Article argues that a CCO’s position is distinct, drawing 
comparisons with the position of a firm’s general counsel or Chief Legal 
Officer (CLO) to illustrate. Additionally, situated within a firm, a CCO is 
responsible for compliance systems that the firm itself designs and 
implements. To be sure, internal compliance systems and personnel may be 
characterized as supplements to or substitutes for external regulation, 
whether imposed ex ante to deter problematic conduct or ex post through 
the imposition of legal and regulatory penalties for misconduct. Lines of 
demarcation between mechanisms of external regulation and internal 
compliance systems are not identically drawn within the financial services 
industry as a whole; Morgan Stanley’s transformation in 2008 to a bank 
holding company from a firm regulated as a securities broker-dealer led, 
inter alia, to the physical presence of full-time regulatory personnel within 
the firm.1 Nonetheless, in general, a CCO’s position differs from those 
occupied by external gatekeepers such as external auditors or rating 
agencies; a compliance officer’s approval is not requisite to open a point of 
entry so that a firm may engage in transactions or other activity. Likewise, a 
CCO’s position differs in fundamental ways from those of compliance 
monitors who are imposed on a firm following major lapses in compliance 
                                                                                                                                       
 * David F. Cavers Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. This Article originated 
with my presentation at the symposium “The Growth and Implications of Compliance in Financial 
Firms: Meanings and Implications” at Brooklyn Law School on February 8, 2013. Although 
severe weather conditions made it imperative that I leave the symposium early, I learned a lot 
from the portion I attended. 
 1. See Aaron Lucchetti & Julie Steinberg, Life on Wall Street Grows Less Risky, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 10, 2013, at A1, A14 (noting that “about 50 full-time government regulators are now 
stationed at Morgan Stanley”). Additionally, the firm has “doubled the head count” for risk 
management and shifted its balance of revenue sources away from investment banking and trading 
toward wealth and asset management. Some highly paid employees departed. Id. 
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and charged with acting as agents on behalf of governmental authorities.2 
Like a CCO and other internal compliance personnel, a compliance monitor 
is tasked to engage with and address compliance issues. However, a 
compliance monitor appointed at the behest of governmental authorities 
functions as their agent; a compliance monitor works inside the monitored 
firm to assist its personnel and only once externally detected misconduct 
triggers the appointment as an alternative to or deferral of criminal 
indictment. 
More generally, assessing the strengths and weaknesses of compliance 
functions and personnel requires a shift in scholarly focus to look deeper 
within private-sector firms and away from a single-eyed focus on firms’ 
boards of directors and Chief Executive Officers (CEOs).3 Compliance 
personnel and processes might be characterized as internal governance 
mechanisms through which a firm may establish and enhance its reputation 
for integrity—at a minimum, for legality—in its operations. The law and 
regulation may enhance a firm’s incentives to invest in its reputation by 
strengthening its compliance functions and the role of compliance 
personnel, most fundamentally by mandating that regulated firms adopt and 
implement policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent 
violations and designating a CCO with responsibility for their 
administration.4 However, effective compliance may also be undercut by 
unforeseen consequences of legal doctrine and regulation, in particular 
consequences that undermine internal compliance personnel and systems, as 
well as by the underdeveloped professional status of compliance functions. 
Better results across the board require more recognition of the practical 
significance of internal compliance and how to strengthen it. 
                                                                                                                                       
 2. Compliance monitors appointed pursuant to deferred prosecution agreements or 
non-prosecution agreements are beyond the scope of this Article. It suffices for present purposes 
to note that evident compliance failures precede their appointment and that the choice of monitor 
is not that of the monitored firm. For a recent example of a post-compliance-failure appointment 
of a monitor, see infra text accompanying notes 10–11. On compliance monitors generally, see 
Veronica Root, The Monitor-‘Client’ Relationship, 100 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2309498.  
 3. For a wide-reaching statement of the importance of scholarly engagement with internal 
governance mechanisms that lower governmental monitoring costs and operate largely below the 
level of a corporation’s board, see Omari Scott Simmons, The Corporate Immune System: 
Governance from the Inside Out, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1131. 
 4. For registered investment advisers, see 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-3(a), (c) (2013). The U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) adopted this rule in 2003. One consequence of 
the registration of many hedge funds mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) was that theretofore unregistered funds, once registered, 
became subject to inspection by the SEC and to the compliance requirements imposed by Rule 
206(4)-3. Id. § 275.206(4)-3. For broker-dealers, see Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange 
Act Release No. 50,347, 83 SEC Docket 2219 (Sept. 10, 2004) (approving proposed rule change 
by National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) to require appointment of a CCO who must 
certify annually that the firm has in place a process to establish, maintain, and test policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to achieve compliance with applicable NASD rules and federal 
securities law). The NASD has been succeeded by FINRA. 
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The Article opens in Part I with an introduction to the 
now-commonplace observation that internal compliance failures have 
dogged many financial-services firms in recent years. Part I uses as 
illustrations two recent incidents that, albeit extreme, are suggestive of 
internal firm structures and other circumstances that may undermine the 
effectiveness of internal compliance personnel and systems and may 
destroy both a firm’s reputation and potentially its ability to continue in 
operation. Part II focuses more narrowly on the CCO’s position, contrasting 
it with roles occupied by other professional and executive agents and 
personnel whose work is relevant to legal and regulatory compliance, in 
particular a firm’s general counsel or CLO. Part II also sketches the 
centrality of the CCO’s functions to a firm’s reputation and explores 
relationships between reputation and regulation. Part III examines a series 
of recent cases to illustrate that legal doctrine and regulation may 
sometimes undermine the effectiveness of compliance systems and 
personnel, as opposed to enhancing a firm’s incentives to strengthen 
internal compliance systems and the positions of those who staff them. The 
Article concludes by returning to the theme of relationships between a 
firm’s reputation and the quality of its internal compliance personnel and 
systems. 
I. NARRATIVES OF FAILED COMPLIANCE 
A. NOW-HISTORICAL EPISODES WITH LARGER IMPLICATIONS 
By definition, narratives of scandal are not celebrations of success 
achieved by compliance systems and personnel. 5  Thus, it would be 
mistaken to base one’s overall assessment of compliance within 
financial-services firms solely on incidents that follow or are associated 
with major compliance failures. However, it would also be mistaken to 
ignore the significance of scandalous episodes that were necessarily 
preceded by compliance failures. This is because their magnitude or 
outrageous character may suggest that systemic reforms are warranted. 
Additionally, even singular or exceptional episodes may illustrate factors 
that explain less spectacular incidents. For example, among now-historic 
scandals preceded by compliance failures, Bernard Madoff’s long-running 
Ponzi scheme carried out in the guise of investment management was 
understood by many observers as evidence of flaws in the SEC’s inspection 
regime for investment advisers and in the self-regulatory regime applicable 
                                                                                                                                       
 5. On scandals more generally, see Deborah A. DeMott, The Stages of Scandal and the Roles 
of General Counsel, 2012 WISC. L. REV. 463, 464 (defining a scandal as an organizational crisis 
that “embroil[s] identifiable actors who are (or should be) held responsible for the consequences 
of their actions,” and noting that “[t]he underlying conduct that makes an incident a scandal often 
violates the law”). 
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to broker-dealers, as well as in the firm’s own compliance efforts. 6 
Similarly, MF Global’s use of client funds in an ill-fated attempt to rescue 
investment bets gone wrong may indicate that regulatory rules applicable to 
intermediaries’ custody and use of clients’ assets are suboptimal.7 
B. RECENT EPISODES ILLUSTRATING MAJOR COMPLIANCE 
FAILURES 
1. HSBC Bank: Organizational Inhibitions to  
Effective Compliance 
Two recent episodes furnish good illustrations of how compliance 
personnel and systems may be compromised. The first demonstrates the 
potential impact of structures allocating authority within a firm or a group 
of affiliated firms, plus inadequate staffing and other resources, as well as 
inhibitions on the intra-firm flow of compliance-relevant information. In 
early July 2013, the federal government filed an information charging 
HSBC Bank USA, N.A. with several criminal offenses, including willfully 
failing to maintain an effective anti-money laundering (AML) program.8 
Separately, its affiliate HSBC Holdings plc was charged with willfully 
facilitating financial transactions on behalf of sanctioned entities in 
violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the 
Trading with the Enemy Act.9 Simultaneously, the government filed a 
deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) with a five-year term, plus an 
agreement in which both entities consented to the appointment of a 
corporate compliance monitor.10 As detailed in the court’s order approving 
                                                                                                                                       
 6. Indeed, the SEC itself acknowledged the need for reforms. See The Securities and 
Exchange Commission Post-Madoff Reforms, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight 
/secpostmadoffreforms.htm (last modified Apr. 2, 2012). As it happens, Madoff operated for many 
years as a registered broker-dealer. Madoff’s advisory business registered with the SEC in 2006, 
having previously relied on an exclusion available to broker-dealers that provided investment 
advice “solely incidental” to broker-dealer activities. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) (2012). 
Although investment advisers are not required to belong to an investor-compensation scheme, 
Madoff’s advisory clients were eligible for compensation through the Securities Investor 
Protection Corporation (the SIPC) because Madoff established no separate business unit for the 
bogus advisory business and, in communicating with advisory clients, used letterhead bearing the 
SIPC member logo. See DIANA B. HENRIQUES, THE WIZARD OF LIES: BERNIE MADOFF AND THE 
DEATH OF TRUST 222 (2011). 
 7. See Ben Protess & Azam Ahmed, MF Global’s Shortfall No Surprise, Some Say, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 28, 2012, at B1; Aaron Lucchetti, Customer Divide at MF Global, WALL St. J., May 
7, 2012, at C2. Of at least anecdotal interest is the fact that MF Global’s senior vice-president for 
legal matters and head of compliance previously served as the head of compliance at Refco, a 
broker that failed due to massive accounting fraud. See DeMott, supra note 5, at 474 n.45.  
 8. See Chad Bray, Judge Approves HSBC Deferred Prosecution Agreement in Money 
Laundering Probe, WALL ST. J. (July 2, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles 
/SB10001424127887323936404578582451462472318.  
 9. See United States v. HSBC Bank, USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161 
(E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013) (Memorandum and Order).  
 10. Id. at *1.  
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the DPA, HSBC Bank failed in several respects to implement an effective 
AML program to monitor suspicious transactions originating in Mexico.11 
At the same time, one of its largest Mexican customers had its own 
significant AML lapses, which enabled Mexican and Colombian drug 
traffickers to launder hundreds of millions of dollars in drug proceeds 
through HSBC Bank.12 HSBC Holdings was aware of these compliance 
problems but failed to inform HSBC Bank of them.13 During an earlier 
period of time, HSBC Holdings and its subsidiaries (all constituting the 
“HSBC Group”) knowingly caused payments to be processed on behalf of 
banks and other entities located in Cuba, Libya, and other countries subject 
to U.S. sanctions.14 Indirectly owned HSBC affiliates around the world 
cooperated to assure non-detection by the United States by “altering and 
routing payment messages in a manner that hid the identities of these 
sanctioned entities from HSBC Bank USA” as well as other U.S. financial 
institutions.15 
Once the dimensions and implications of the scandal became evident, 
HSBC made major changes in its leadership teams, including the CEO, 
CLO, and Head of Global Standards Assurance at HSBC Holdings; and 
HSBC North America’s CEO, General Counsel, CCO, and AML Director, 
among other high-level personnel changes.16 However, characteristics of 
HSBC’s previous compliance systems and AML programs generally 
illustrate causes of compliance failure more generally that are distinct from 
the limitations and foibles of particular individuals, even when the 
consequences of failure seem likely to injure the reputation of both the firm 
and the individuals implicated in the fiasco. 17 First, responsibility for 
compliance was diffused across a large organization, and compliance 
personnel at the overall group level lacked authority to mandate actions at 
the group-affiliate level. 18  Additionally, at the affiliate level, lines of 
responsibility were not crisply drawn; it was “unclear” whether 
responsibility for AML compliance ultimately rested with AML officers or 
the bank’s business personnel.19 Second, compliance within HSBC Bank 
USA was understaffed because since 2007, bank-wide initiatives to cut 
costs and increase the bank’s return on equity led to freezes on staffing 
levels and the non-replacement of senior officers, including the regional 
                                                                                                                                       
 11. Id. at *8–9.  
 12. Id. at *8.  
 13. Id. at *9.  
 14. Id.  
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. at *10.  
 17. On the importance of overall organizational coherence in compliance systems beyond 
particular business units, see Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Don’t Divorce the GC and Compliance 
Officer, CORP. COUNS., Jan. 2011, at 48, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/plp 
/pdf/Dont_Divorce_the_GC_and_Compliance_Officer.pdf.   
 18. HSBC Bank, 2013 WL 3306161, at *9.  
 19. Id.  
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compliance officer.20 Third, HSBC’s culture was one that discouraged 
sharing information across the organization, including compliance-related 
information.21 Thus, compliance problems with Mexican transactions went 
unreported to personnel at HSBC Bank USA because personnel at 
Holdings, aware of the problems, did not inform their colleagues at Bank 
USA.22 At HSBC Bank USA, formal policy did not permit conducting due 
diligence on other group affiliates, which inhibited Bank USA’s ability to 
assess the AML risks to which it was exposed.23 Indeed, some affiliates 
structured transactions so that HSBC Bank USA could not review them 
adequately even when it requested full details.24 
These details illustrate features of organizational structure and culture 
that could undercut the effectiveness of any complex organization’s 
compliance program. The details are also telling indicators of the status of 
compliance programs and personnel. The vulnerability of compliance 
staffing to spending freezes driven by cost-cutting/return-on-equity 
concerns is inconsistent with placing a high organizational priority on 
compliance, as is a formal policy that inhibits asking questions about 
transactions originating elsewhere within a dispersed organization. Lack of 
clarity about responsibility for AML compliance, additionally, may have 
undermined the power of compliance officers by furnishing a basis on 
which its exercise could be contested. 
2. SAC Capital Advisors: Alleged Infirmities in  
Compliance Functions 
A separate episode freshly suggests the frequency with which 
compliance failures may be linked to the relative power of CCOs and other 
compliance personnel within financial services organizations. If true, the 
SEC’s recent allegations in an order instituting administrative proceedings25 
against Steven A. Cohen, the founder and owner of hedge fund S.A.C. 
Capital Advisors, L.P. (SAC or SAC Capital), depict conduct in an 
organization in which visible interventions by compliance personnel were 
                                                                                                                                       
 20. Id.  
 21. Id.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Id.  
 25. The SEC instituted administrative proceedings under section 203(f) of the Investment 
Advisers Act. This section requires that the SEC “censure or place limitations on the activities of 
any person” associated with an investment adviser when the Commission finds, after a hearing, 
that such action is in the public interest and the person has committed any of the acts enumerated 
in subsection 203(e). See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(f) (2012). In Cohen, the SEC’s order alleges that the 
respondent failed reasonably to supervise two portfolio managers who engaged in illegal insider 
trading through which they allegedly earned profits and avoided losses totaling in excess of $275 
million. Cohen, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3634, 2013 WL 3776681 (July 19, 2013) 
[hereinafter Cohen Release], available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2013/ia-3634.pdf; 
see 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e)(6). 
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striking by their absence.26 In particular, the order details allegations that 
Mr. Cohen failed to discharge his duty to supervise personnel; he received 
“highly suspicious information” 27  from two portfolio managers who 
reported directly to him, in interactions replete with “red flags”28 indicative 
of the possession and proposed use of inside information in violation of 
SAC Capital’s own Code of Ethics and federal law. Throughout the 
narrative in the order, the firm’s CCO goes unmentioned, as do activities by 
any other compliance officer. One interpretation of their absence—of 
course others are possible too—is that the invisibility of compliance 
personnel corresponded to a lack of relative power within the firm, which 
inhibited or shaped their interactions with portfolio managers. In contrast, 
among hedge funds more generally, portfolio managers are themselves 
treated as a front line of compliance to enforce prohibitions against trading 
on inside information because internal rules require that they consult the 
firm’s compliance personnel immediately if they suspect they have received 
inside information, including from colleagues within the firm.29 Incentive 
structures at SAC Capital may have overpowered some actors’ commitment 
to comply with policies that conformed to industry norms.30 
As it happens, compliance personnel appear frequently in the 
allegations made in the federal criminal indictment of SAC Capital and 
affiliated entities filed later the same month.31 The indictment alleges that 
the “limited SAC compliance systems” were “overwhelmed” by a business 
culture “fostered” by the “relentless pursuit of an information edge” to the 
extent that “there was no meaningful commitment to ensure that such 
‘edge’ came from legitimate research and not Inside Information.” 32 
Allegedly, a portfolio manager was hired over objections expressed by 
SAC’s Legal Department; an employee of the hedge fund that previously 
employed the portfolio manager warned he was “known for being part of 
[that fund’s] ‘insider trading group.’”33 Indicative of the role compliance 
personnel may have played in the firm’s operations is the allegation that a 
recently hired portfolio manager apologized to the firm’s owner for a 
“‘cryptic’” instant message in which he referred to “‘recent research’” as 
the basis for a plan to short a stock because “the head of SAC compliance 
                                                                                                                                       
 26. Cohen Release, supra note 25. 
 27. Id. para. 3, at 1.  
 28. Id.  
 29. See Bryan Burrough & Bethany McLean, The Hunt for Steve Cohen, VANITY FAIR, June 
2013, at 100, 147. 
 30. See infra text accompanying notes 31–36. 
 31. Sealed Indictment, United States v. S.A.C. Capital Advisors, L.P., No. 13-CR-541 
(S.D.N.Y. filed July 25, 2013) [hereinafter SAC Indictment], available at http://www.justice.gov 
/usao/nys/pressreleases/July13/SACChargingAndSupportingDocuments/SAC%20Indictment 
%20(Stamped).pdf. 
 32. Id. para. 7, at 4.  
 33. Id. para. 19, at 15.  
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‘was giving me Rules 101 yesterday—so I won’t be saying much,’”34 an 
episode that is even more troubling if compliance personnel explicitly or 
implicitly furnished instructions on how best to paraphrase emails and other 
electronic communications to mask indicia of plans to engage in illegal 
conduct. Indeed, allegedly until 2009, SAC compliance personnel only 
rarely reviewed intra-firm electronic communications for signs of 
problematic conduct, despite a recommendation made in 2005 by SAC’s 
head of compliance.35 Perhaps due to these limitations, the compliance 
department conducted only a “few” investigations of insider trading, 
focusing on interviewing research analysts and portfolio managers and 
“‘confirming’ . . . that an e-mail implying access to Inside Information was 
an inartfully drafted e-mail.” 36  Throughout an era in which several 
insider-trading cases occurred at SAC that have led to guilty pleas by 
several individual defendants, the compliance department 
contemporaneously identified only one instance of insider trading by SAC 
employees in its entire history.37 
As acknowledged earlier in this Part, dwelling on such episodes (and so 
far only alleged episodes concerning SAC Capital) can generate misleading 
conclusions about the effectiveness of compliance systems and personnel 
overall as well as the relative power of CCOs and compliance professionals 
within contemporary financial-services firms; after all, it seems inevitable 
that a large organization will experience some lapses in compliance that no 
CLO or CCO could have prevented.38 However, the narrative power of 
these more extreme episodes as cautionary tales is undeniable, as may be 
their potential to strengthen the hand of CCOs within their organizations. 
II. THE CCO’S POSITION AND THE FIRM’S REPUTATION 
Legal compliance can fairly be characterized as “integral to the daily 
operations of large companies,”39 and, in the highly regulated context of 
                                                                                                                                       
 34. Id. para. 23, at 21.  
 35. Id. para. 24, at 22. SAC did enlarge its cohort of compliance personnel once the SEC 
began the insider-trading investigation in 2006, from three in 2005 to thirty-six in 2013. Burrough 
& McLean, supra note 29, at 104. SAC also became “one of the first hedge funds” to create a 
separate compliance department “led by a well-respected professional.” Id. at 103–04. In 2013, 
SAC reportedly further enlarged its compliance staff and, by May, had attempted to recruit a new 
“senior-level compliance executive,” an effort seen by individuals close to SAC as potentially a 
diminishment of the internal role of the firm’s CCO. See Jenny Strasburg & Michael Rothfeld, 
Four Top SAC Executives Receive Subpoenas in Probe, WALL ST. J. (May 23, 2013, 9:10 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323975004578501212048252892. The 
recruitment effort was unsuccessful. Id.  
 36. SAC Indictment, supra note 31, para. 28, at 25.  
 37. Id.  
 38. See James B. Stewart, When Trying to Follow Rules Isn’t Enough, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 
2013, at B1 (commenting on general counsel of JPMorgan Chase & Co. in light of firm’s 
agreement to admit wrongdoing and pay close to $1 billion in fines for its conduct in “London 
Whale” incident in which firm lost more than $6 billion and misled bank regulators about its loss). 
 39. Simmons, supra note 3, at 1145.  
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contemporary financial-services firms, to have a texture that requires 
engagement with many specifics—some highly technical, others less so.40 
And legal and regulatory specifics vary in their degree of determinacy over 
a spectrum that ranges categorically from stated rules that leave no room for 
interpretation or discretion to more open-ended standards. 41  Overall, 
compliance programs aim to determine whether a firm’s operations meet 
legal and regulatory requirements, whether indicia of problematic conduct 
should be investigated, and whether the firm’s internal information flow 
meets requisite standards for accuracy and processing. 42  Additionally, 
when warranted, compliance systems should bring material information to 
management’s attention.43 Many internal functions and personnel aid in the 
design and implementation of these systems, including the firm’s internal 
audit department, its CLO and her staff, as well as the firm’s CCO and any 
other personnel distinctively assigned to compliance functions.44 Although 
a designated CCO bears internal responsibility for the administration of 
compliance systems and the supervision of compliance-department 
personnel, the overall efficacy of compliance requires engagement in some 
form from other internal actors, including the CEO, other members of the 
senior management team, and the firm’s directors,45 as well as the firm’s 
general counsel or CLO.  
A. THE CCO AND THE CLO 
For starters, the same person may serve as CCO as well as CLO.46 As a 
consequence, it can be difficult to specify with precision the functions and 
roles distinctively served by a CCO. One starting point is to compare the 
                                                                                                                                       
 40. See id. at 1145–46 (noting that compliance systems are not uniform and “differ according 
to jurisdiction, industry, company, and operational context”).  
 41. Id. at 1135. 
 42. Id. at 1145.  
 43. Id.  
 44. See Heineman, supra note 17, at 49. 
 45. The Delaware Court of Chancery made clear in 1996 that responsibility for legal and 
regulatory compliance extended upward to a corporation’s board. See In re Caremark Int’l 
Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (stating in dictum that “a director’s 
obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate information and 
reporting system . . . exists, and that a failure to do so . . . may . . . render a director liable for 
losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal standards”). More recently, the Court of 
Chancery explained that Caremark liability does not encompass internal systems that are flawed 
because they do not adequately monitor business risks. See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder 
Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 139 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 46. This Article does not address three questions that are relevant to the situation of CCOs: (1) 
to whom should a CCO report; (2) who should have authority to hire and fire a CCO; and (3) 
should a firm’s CCO and CLO necessarily be different individuals. Answers to these questions 
vary, due in part to significant differences among firms and industries. On the third question, the 
health-care industry has a distinctive history. See John B. McNeece IV, The Ethical Conflicts of 
the Hybrid General Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 677, 
692–94 (2012); see also Heineman, supra note 17, at 48 (arguing that CCO should report to the 
CLO and CFO).  
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functions served by a CCO with those of a firm’s general counsel or CLO. 
In earlier work I identified four distinct roles—some in tension with each 
other—that a CLO occupies.47 These are service as: (1) a legal adviser to 
the corporation and its constituents, including its senior management and 
board of directors;48 (2) a corporate officer and member of the senior 
management team; 49 (3) the administrator of the firm’s internal legal 
department;50 and (4) an agent of the firm in its dealings with third parties, 
including governmental authorities.51 Although a CCO’s responsibilities 
overlap these roles to some extent, overall their focus is narrower, 
excluding, for example, the negotiation of transactions on behalf of the 
corporation and the supervision of internal lawyers who work on matters 
that are not compliance-related.52 Additionally, when a CCO is not a 
lawyer, the CCO is not subject to the distinctive self-regulation of the legal 
profession and the obligations it imposes;53 whether the work of a CCO 
who is licensed as a lawyer constitutes “practicing law” is open to dispute. 
In contrast, a CLO, like any in-house lawyer, has more crisply delineated 
duties, including the duty to report-up corporate misconduct imposed by 
section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Rule of Professional Conduct 
1.13.54    
Otherwise, hard-and-fast lines are hard to draw. In highly regulated 
businesses like financial services, advice related to legal compliance may be 
closely related to business decisions to be made by the firm’s operational 
management. 55 Additionally, determining when and how to investigate 
based on information that comes to the attention of compliance personnel 
implicates judgments to be made by personnel charged with the 
corporation’s legal function.56 Pursuing what went wrong requires a degree 
of independence from the firm’s management; whether and when to bring 
in external counsel is itself a decision that can be crucial to the credibility of 
                                                                                                                                       
 47. Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 
965–74 (2005). 
 48. Id. at 965.  
 49. Id. at 967.  
 50. Id. at 969.  
 51. Id. at 970.  
 52. See Heineman, supra note 17, at 49 (emphasizing “process integration and rigor” as role of 
CCO and observing that “although substantive lawyers have expertise and knowledge to assess 
legal and ethical risks in their areas, and to design specific mitigants, they may not have the 
process skills that great compliance leaders possess”). 
 53. See Dana A. Remus, Out of Practice: The Twenty-First Century Legal Profession, 63 
DUKE L.J., (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 17), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2344888. 
 54. Id. (manuscript at 27 n.119). 
 55. See Heineman, supra note 17, at 48 (noting the range of critical decisions made by senior 
management and directors that have “a legal or ethical component—a new deal, a new product, a 
new geography, a new government investigation”). 
 56. See id. 
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an investigation conducted by an internal compliance officer.57 In some 
reported instances, firms use compliance personnel as their agents in 
communicating with external constituencies, such as clients, to furnish 
credible assurances about the quality of the firm’s compliance systems and 
controls.58 
How compliance functions are perceived and received within firms 
appears to vary, with some firms’ powerfully situated CCOs and personnel 
contrasting with their counterparts in firms that, through formal structures 
or less formal cultures, foreclose interventions by the CCO and the 
compliance department or resist those interventions as unnecessary 
impediments to operating the firm’s business. For example, within 
JPMorgan Chase & Co., major internal restructurings in the aftermath of the 
“London Whale” debacle led to the empowerment of compliance and 
control groups “as equals to their business counterparts,” which implies 
prior inequalities in power within the firm.59 And personnel in charge of 
legal, risk-management, and compliance functions “can no longer be 
overruled by business heads.”60  
In addition, it may be telling that compliance functions are sometimes 
associated with modifiers like “rote,” 61  which seems to exclude the 
                                                                                                                                       
 57. See Anton R. Valukas et al., Investigation and Disclosure of Violations, in COMPLIANCE 
PROGRAMS AND THE CORPORATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 15:7 (Jeffrey Kaplan & Joseph 
Murphy eds., 2013) (discussing considerations that weigh in favor of, and against, the choice of 
outside counsel to perform internal investigations).  
 58. See Strasburg & Rothfeld, supra note 35 (reporting that president and CCO of SAC 
Capital “also hold roles that have been visible to SAC’s clients over the past year, as they have 
conveyed confidence in SAC’s compliance and trading controls”); see also Peter Lattman, 4 SAC 
Executives Subpoenaed in Insider Trading Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2013, at B3, available at 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/4-sac-executives-subpoenaed-in-insider 
-trading-inquiry/ (reporting that SAC’s CCO, who “oversees the firm’s internal regulatory 
regime,” has in recent months “been among the SAC executives who have tried to reassure the 
firm’s concerned investors”). 
 59. See Monica Langley & Dan Fitzpatrick, Embattled J.P. Morgan Bulks Up Oversight, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2013 at A1, A2. JPMorgan Chase’s COO, at the insistence of regulators, 
now reports to the firm’s chief operating officer, not its CLO. Id. at A2. The overall cost is an 
additional $4 billion, with a commitment of 5000 additional employees. Id. at A1. 
 60. Id. at A1. (contrasting relative autonomy of such personnel at JPMorgan Chase with their 
counterparts in rival banks).  
 61. In a recent example, albeit in a different context from the other examples explored in this 
Article, SEC Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher criticized undue reliance by institutional 
shareholders on recommendations generated by proxy advisory firms in deciding how to vote 
shares on behalf of clients. See Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks at Society of 
Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals (July 11, 2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2013/spch071113dmg.htm. His criticisms may be well-founded, 
but consider the language in which they were couched:  
 
Given the sheer volume of votes, institutional shareholders, particularly investment advisers, 
may view their responsibility to vote on proxy matters with more of a compliance mindset 
than a fiduciary mindset.  
. . . . 
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possibility that compliance functions may require the exercise of nuanced 
judgment and to deny the reality that a firm’s compliance failures may 
doom it. It also ignores the fact that the effectiveness of much regulation 
depends on implementations internal to regulated firms themselves, most 
likely preceded by discussion within the firm (including its compliance 
personnel) and productive interactions with the firm’s legal counsel, 
whether situated internally or externally. These internal conversations, like 
the decisions they precede, help ensure the effectiveness of regulation by 
resituating regulated firms as participants in the regulatory process that are 
able to understand, if not share, the regulator’s perspective and objectives.62  
Finally, the status and evolutionary stage of compliance activity as a 
profession, distinct from the legal profession, may lurk in the background. 
Unlike lawyers, compliance professionals as such are not licensed by the 
state, nor is a particular course of formal education requisite to performing 
their work. Although compliance professionals may choose to be associated 
with membership organizations,63 these organizations do not (or, at least, 
do not yet) perform the sorts of self-regulatory functions associated with 
professional organizations in classic professions, such as law and 
accounting. Nor has the organized legal profession yet embraced the 
challenges posed by compliance work performed by licensed lawyers 
within organizational settings.64  
                                                                                                                                       
It is troubling to think that institutional investors . . . are treating their responsibility akin to a 
compliance function carried out through rote reliance on proxy advisory firm advice rather 
than actively researching the proposals . . . and ensuring that their votes further their clients’ 
interests. 
 
Id. Again, the Commissioner’s critique of how institutional shareholders determine to vote may be 
persuasive, but the assumed opposition between “compliance mindsets” and compliance 
“functions,” on the one hand, and those associated with a fiduciary may carry implications for 
how compliance personnel and the functions they perform are perceived, at least in some quarters.  
 62. For fuller development of this point, see ANNELISE RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE: 
LEGAL REASONING IN THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 234–36 (2011). As Professor Riles 
explains, regulatory efficacy always depends on implementation; “new architectures historically 
have never worked at the level of design. Where regulatory reforms have succeeded, it has been 
because, in one way or another, they enroll the targets or clients of regulation in the regulatory 
mission and encourage them to take responsibility for the regulatory problem.” Id. at 227. 
 63. Examples of membership organizations focused on compliance professionals in general 
include the Ethics and Compliance Officer Association, see ETHICS & COMPLIANCE OFFICER 
ASS’N, http://www.theecoa.org/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2013), and the Society for Corporate 
Compliance and Ethics, see SOC’Y FOR CORP. COMPLIANCE & ETHICS, 
https://www.corporatecompliance.org/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). An organization specific to 
compliance professionals in investment advisor firms is National Regulatory Services, which 
offers certification programs, plus consulting and other services. See NAT’L REG. SERVICES, 
http://www.nrs-inc.com/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
 64. See Remus, supra note 53.  
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B. THE CCO AND A FIRM’S INVESTMENT IN ITS OWN REPUTATION 
Further vantage points on a CCO’s functions are suggested by Jonathan 
Macey’s recent scholarship on corporate reputation.65 Tracing a perceived 
decline in reputation’s significance relative to regulation in 
financial-services firms, Professor Macey notes concurrent shifts in a 
“reputational industry” consisting of “products and services specifically 
designed and engineered for the purpose of lowering the costs of attaining 
the benefits of a reputation for honesty and integrity.”66 Although Professor 
Macey’s account focuses on such service providers as external auditors, law 
firms, and credit rating agencies, one might conceptualize a CCO and other 
compliance professionals as internal forces that under optimal 
circumstances can institutionalize practices that enhance a firm’s reputation 
and then serve as bulwarks against other internal forces that can jeopardize 
that reputation.67 Seen in this way, the position of a CCO, more singly 
focused than the CLO’s role, constitutes an investment by the firm in the 
long-term asset that its reputation represents.68 Additionally, success in a 
CCO’s role is highly unlikely to stem from an oppositional posture toward 
regulation. The adversarial posture that a CLO (or another lawyer) may 
appropriately adopt is inapposite for a CCO because effectiveness will not 
stem from treating either the relevant law and regulation, or their enforcers, 
as the firm’s adversaries, as a CLO or external counsel might well be 
warranted in doing.69 
                                                                                                                                       
 65. See JONATHAN R. MACEY, THE DEATH OF CORPORATE REPUTATION: HOW INTEGRITY 
HAS BEEN DESTROYED ON WALL STREET (2013). 
 66. Id. at 124.  
 67. Professor Macey’s book does not address internal compliance as such, so the implications I 
draw in this Article, although sparked by his book, are not necessarily ones he would endorse.  
 68. On theories of reputation and its effects more generally, see, e.g., Rachel Brewster, 
Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 231, 259–66 (2009) (arguing that 
reputation for compliance on the part of states may be issue-specific or may have broader reach); 
DeMott, supra note 5, at 472–73 (characterizing reputation as “an intuitive and somewhat 
indeterminate concept” that is often personalized to particular actors and that may operate 
differently depending on whether the subject is an individual or an organization). Additionally, 
Professor Macey’s argument emphasizes that individuals’ reputations may be decoupled from the 
firms for which they work. See MACEY, supra note 65, at 96–99. Thus, individuals’ reputations 
may not suffer— nor may their individual wealth— in the wake of a major scandal that consumes 
their firm. Id. at 90–96. But this decoupling is not universally true; following the indictment of 
hedge fund SAC Capital, which allegedly engaged in a pervasive insider-trading scheme, other 
hedge fund managers were reportedly reluctant to hire SAC veterans as portfolio managers. See 
Juliet Chung, Funds’ Employees Face Uncertainty, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2013, at A6.  
 69. Somewhat along the same lines, Professor Macey distinguishes lawyers from auditors and 
accountants more generally, writing: 
 
Although intelligence, thoroughness, and attention to detail are important qualities in both 
professions, the best accountants are those who stay firmly within the lines when they take up 
their brushes and paint for clients. In sharp contrast, the very best lawyers are those who 
develop new ways of doing deals or develop new strategies and tactics to advance their 
clients’ interests and to surprise and confound the opposition. 
 
2013] Position of the Chief Compliance Officer 69 
III. LAW, REGULATION, AND THE CCO’S  
  PRECARIOUS POSITION 
If the effectiveness of the CCO is integral to creating and preserving a 
firm’s reputation over time for integrity, as well as to assuring the firm’s 
compliance with applicable law and regulation, it is important that the 
CCO’s position not be undermined by unforeseen consequences that stem 
from the law, regulatory strategy, or lacunae in professional 
self-regulation. 70  Seen in this light, the position of CCOs and other 
compliance professionals has not been strengthened by recent 
developments, in particular in the common-law doctrine applicable to 
compliance personnel, and, in a more diffused way, in the patchwork of 
federal statutes applicable to individuals who bring to light within a firm 
information that is suggestive of illegal behavior by others.71 Together 
these developments call into question how secure a CCO’s position may be 
when the CCO’s actions prove unwelcome to those in control of a firm. 
Separately, to the extent that a CCO can be characterized as the 
“supervisor” of a firm’s miscreant employee for SEC regulatory purposes, 
the CCO faces the risk of personal liability for failing reasonably to 
supervise that employee even when the firm’s allocation of power situates 
the employee within the protective ambit of another officer.72 
A. THE CCO AND THE COMMON LAW OF EMPLOYMENT 
Consider first the status of a CCO from the standpoint of the common 
law of employment. In most jurisdictions within the United States, an 
employer commits a tort when it fires or otherwise retaliates against an 
employee who reports or inquires in a reasonable manner about conduct the 
employee reasonably and in good faith believes violates either the law or an 
established principle of professional conduct that protects the public 
                                                                                                                                       
See MACEY, supra note 65, at 153. For accountants, “creativity” or “creative accounting” has 
negative connotations (“is a very bad thing”) whereas “‘[c]reative lawyering’ is a good thing.” Id. 
Although I do not propose conflating CCOs and other compliance officers with accountants, 
“creative compliance” may not strike the same positive notes as “creative lawyering.” As 
Professor Macey observes, “regulators, lenders, and investors do not want to be known to be 
associated with accounting firms or accountants that are thought to interpret the accounting rules 
creatively or aggressively” while “many lawyers pride themselves . . . as being particularly 
creative and aggressive in asserting and defending their clients’ views.” Id.  
 70. See id. at 248 (“Regulation and reputation are closely connected. A thoughtful, 
well-considered regulatory strategy might . . . use scarce enforcement resources in order to 
reinforce rather than to undermine the value of companies’ investments in their own reputations 
for honesty and fair dealing with customers.”).  
 71. For a briefer treatment of some of the same cases, see Deborah A. DeMott, Internal 
Compliance Officers in Jeopardy?, 87 AUSTL. L.J. 451 (2013). 
 72. See infra Part III.C. 
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interest.73 Although some states require that employees report internally 
before “reporting out” to governmental authorities and a few do not protect 
employees who report only internally, in many states the nature of the 
wrongdoing indicated by the information is determinative.74 Regardless, 
under New York law, an employer’s retaliation under these circumstances 
is not tortious, even when the point of an employee’s job is detecting and 
reporting problematic conduct. In Sullivan v. Harnisch, a majority of the 
Court of Appeals held in 2012 that a CCO had no tort claim against his 
former employer, a group of hedge funds with a common investment 
adviser, when the CCO was fired after confronting the funds’ controlling 
shareholder about trading activity on behalf of that shareholder and 
members of his family that appeared to front-run client orders.75 The court 
reasoned that the CCO, as an employee at will, had no claim for wrongful 
discharge and, unhappily for him, fell outside of New York’s narrow 
exception to the state’s especially robust employment-at-will doctrine.76 
Sullivan underlines the narrowness of this exception, articulated by the 
court in 1992 in Wieder v. Skala.77 In Wieder, the court held that a law firm 
breached an implied contractual obligation when it discharged an associate 
who insisted that the firm comply with the applicable professional 
disciplinary rules and report the professional misconduct of a fellow 
associate.78 Representing as it does a claim for breach of contract, the 
exception to employment-at-will recognized by Wieder limits a discharged 
employee’s remedies to those available for breach of contract.79  
Tellingly, the Sullivan majority distinguished Wieder largely on the 
basis of a compliance officer’s professional status compared with that of a 
lawyer like the law-firm associate in Wieder.80 In the majority’s reasoning, 
a CCO, “not associated with other compliance officers in a firm where all 
were subject to self-regulation as members of a common profession,”81 is 
too unlike an associate lawyer whose regulatory and ethical responsibilities 
are so closely linked to his or her duties as an employee that they are 
                                                                                                                                       
 73. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.02(e) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 
2009), available at http://www.ali.org/00021333/Employment%20Law%20TD%20No%202%20- 
%20Revised%20-%20September%202009.pdf. 
 74. See id. cmt. f.  
 75. Sullivan v. Harnisch, 969 N.E.2d 758, 759 (N.Y. 2012). To front-run a client’s order 
breaches an advisor’s fiduciary duty to the client; front-running consists of executing a purchase 
(or sale) of a security in anticipation of executing a client’s order to buy (or sell). See ALAN R. 
BROMBERG ET AL., BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD § 6:77 (2013). In Sullivan, 
the CCO believed that the controlling shareholders’ sales improperly excluded clients from a 
trading opportunity. See Sullivan, 969 N.E.2d at 760. 
 76. Sullivan, 969 N.E.2d at 759–60. 
 77. Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1992). 
 78. Id. at 108–09. 
 79. Id. at 110. 
 80. Sullivan, 969 N.E.2d at 761. 
 81. Id.  
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inseparable. 82  Of course, this distinction assumes, as a prototype, a 
particular mode of professional practice—association together in a firm 
solely dedicated to furnishing a professional service—that appears to 
delegitimate the professional stature of work done by members of a 
profession who are also their clients’ employees. Additionally, the 
majority’s reasoning implicates the less developed state of the compliance 
professions by emphasizing the absence of a defined profession with 
self-regulatory functions.83 Further unhelpful to the CCO in Sullivan was 
the fact that he wore multiple hats, serving also as Executive 
Vice-President, Chief Operating Officer, Secretary, and Treasurer, which 
made him “not even a full-time compliance officer” in the majority’s 
assessment. 84  This line of reasoning is especially troubling because 
multiple-hatted status seems more likely to typify CCOs in smaller firms 
that lack the resources or the practical necessity for a CCO who serves 
exclusively in that role. That is not to suggest that compliance problems 
occur disproportionately within smaller firms, only that smaller firms with 
less hierarchy and less-elaborated management structures may make a CCO 
particularly vulnerable when his or her interventions prove unwelcome. 
Underscoring this point, terminating a CCO is a reportable event that a 
registered investment advisor (like the employer in Sullivan) must report to 
the SEC and FINRA if the firm is regulated as a broker-dealer.85 Although 
it is likely that such a report would trigger investigations into the firm, these 
foreseeable regulatory consequences did not deter the CCO’s employer in 
Sullivan, although they may temper conduct within larger registered firms 
with investor clienteles to whom the firm’s reputation for probity is highly 
material. 
                                                                                                                                       
 82. See Wieder, 609 N.E.2d at 108. In Wieder, the court held that 
 
in any hiring of an attorney as an associate to practice law with a firm there is implied an 
understanding so fundamental to the relationship and essential to its purpose as to require no 
expression: that both the associate and the firm in conducting the practice will do so in 
accordance with the ethical standards of the profession.  
 
Id.  
 83. See Sullivan, 969 N.E.2d at 761. 
 84. Id.  
 85. For investment advisers, Item 1J on the required registration form, Form ADV, requires 
that the adviser furnish the name and contact information for its CCO. See Form ADV, 17 C.F.R.  
§ 279.1 (2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formadv-part1a.pdf. The instructions 
that govern Form ADV require that an amendment be made (and filed) “promptly” when 
information provided in response to this item becomes “inaccurate in any way.” See Form ADV: 
General Instructions, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formadv-instructions.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2013). For broker-dealers, FINRA Rule 3130 requires that a CCO be designated and 
identified to FINRA. See Overview of FINRA Rule 3130, FINRA, http://www.finra.org 
/Industry/Issues/SupervisoryControl/P038004 (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
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B. THE CCO AND WHISTLEBLOWERS UNDER FEDERAL  
SECURITIES LAW 
Both Dodd-Frank and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(Sarbanes-Oxley) amended earlier federal securities law to add protections 
for “whistleblowers,” in particular prohibiting retaliation against employees 
who report information that establishes violations of the law.86 However, 
the language stating these prohibitions, like its subsequent interpretation by 
federal courts, does not necessarily strengthen the position of CCOs and 
other compliance personnel who, like the CCO in Sullivan, are 
employees-at-will, especially those to whom New York law would apply. 
More generally, these developments may risk undercutting the effectiveness 
of internal compliance programs, distinct from the position of the CCO and 
other compliance personnel. In Sullivan, the CCO did not report to the SEC 
the information concerning suspected front-running.87 Instead, and as one 
                                                                                                                                       
 86. Specifically, Sarbanes-Oxley provides: 
 
No company with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 . . . , or that is required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 . . . , or any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of 
such company, may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner 
discriminate against an employee . . . because of any lawful act done by the employee— 
(1) to provide information, cause information to be provided, or otherwise assist in an 
investigation regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably believes constitutes a 
violation of section 1341, 1343, 1344, 1348, any rule or regulation of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against 
shareholders, when the information or assistance is provided to or the investigation is 
conducted by— 
(A) a Federal regulatory or law enforcement agency; 
(B) any Member of Congress or any committee of Congress; or 
(C) a person with supervisory authority over the employee (or such other person working 
for the employer who has authority to investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct . . . . 
 
18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012). Section 922(a) of Dodd-Frank amended the Exchange Act by creating 
section 21F, which pertains to incentives and protections for securities whistleblowers. 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. 
111-203, sec. 922, § 21F, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841–49 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 
78u-6). Section 21F(a)(6) defines a “whistleblower” as “any individual who provides, or 2 or 
more individuals acting jointly who provide, information relating to a violation of the securities 
laws to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.” 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6). Section 21F(b) authorizes the SEC to make monetary rewards to whistle-
blowers to be computed on the basis of percentages of any monetary sanctions imposed in an 
action stemming from the voluntary provision of information by a whistleblower. Id. § 
78u-6(a)(6). Although auditors are among those excluded from eligibility for monetary rewards, 
see id. § 78u-6(c)(2)(C), internal compliance personnel are not expressly excluded. Section 
21F(h)(1)(A) prohibits retaliation by an employer against a whistleblower “because of any lawful 
act done by the whistleblower . . . in providing information to the Commission . . . [or] in making 
disclosures that are required or protected under . . . Sarbanes-Oxley . . . , the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 . . . , and any other law, rule, or regulation” subject to the SEC’s jurisdiction. Id. § 
78u-6(h)(1)(A). 
 87. See Sullivan, 969 N.E.2d at 761 (observing that “Sullivan does not claim to have blown a 
whistle—i.e. to have told the SEC or anyone else outside of [firm] about . . . alleged misconduct”).   
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would think a CCO should generally do, he reported upward within his firm 
to the firm’s CEO.88 Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Sullivan 
read Dodd-Frank’s prohibition of retaliatory firings to require reporting-out, 
that is, to the SEC.89 Likewise, in the sole decision on point from a federal 
appellate court, the Fifth Circuit held in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C. 
that Dodd-Frank’s protections for whistleblowers do not encompass an 
employee who reports information concerning a violation internally within 
the firm but not to the SEC.90 The Fifth Circuit also declined to defer to the 
SEC’s rule to the contrary that construes Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation 
provision not to require reporting to the SEC because, in the court’s 
analysis, the rule redefined the statutory term “whistleblower” to include 
individuals who never report information to the SEC, whereas the statutory 
definition itself includes only “any individual who provides . . . information 
relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission.”91  
Ironically, some commentators feared that Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower 
provisions would “undermine the effectiveness of . . . internal compliance 
programs” because Dodd-Frank created incentives in the form of a 
monetary reward program (not at issue in Asadi) to report directly to the 
SEC.92 However, as Asadi illustrates, the efficacy of internal compliance 
confronts a greater challenge because Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation 
provision protects only individuals who report-out to the SEC, whether 
those individuals are compliance personnel or other employees. This 
appears to create an incentive to bypass internal compliance mechanisms 
altogether, or to inform the SEC prior to internal reporting or the 
completion of any internal investigation, in order to avoid jeopardizing an 
anti-retaliation claim. 93 Although most employees as of 2012 at least 
                                                                                                                                       
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. The majority concludes that “[n]othing in federal law persuades us that we should 
change our own law to create a remedy when Congress did not.” Id. To the dissenters, the 
majority “creates a problem for legislators to solve where none existed previously” because 
“[p]rior to today, it was unnecessary for either Congress or this State’s Legislature to create a new 
rule to protect employees like Sullivan” because it would have been assumed that the exception to 
employment-at-will recognized in Wieder would apply to compliance officers. Id. at 765 
(Lippman, J., dissenting). 
 90. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 630 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 91. Id. at 623 (referring to Dodd-Frank Act section 922). The court declined to find that the 
statute itself left the definition of covered individuals in doubt; the separate subsection specifying 
the prohibition against retaliation applies to adverse employment actions “because of any lawful 
act done by the whistleblower . . . in making disclosures that are required or protected under” the 
federal securities laws. Id. at 624 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)). The SEC’s rule defines 
“whistleblower” to encompass an individual who “possess[es] a reasonable belief” that 
information provided “relates to a possible securities law violation” and the information is 
provided in the manner provided in § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). See Whistleblower Status and Retaliation 
Protection, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2 (2013). 
 92. See E. NORMAN VEASEY & CHRISTINE T. DI GUGLIELMO, INDISPENSABLE COUNSEL: THE 
CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER IN THE NEW REALITY 22–23 (2012). 
 93. See Jenna Greene, Fifth Circuit Cuts Employers Out of Whistleblower Loop, NAT’L L. J., 
(July 18, 2013), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id= 1202611485898&Fifth 
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initially raised concerns about illegal conduct within their employer’s 
organization,94 Asadi underscores the importance of reporting to the SEC.95  
In contrast, although the remedies are more limited 96  and the 
enforcement mechanisms more cumbersome 97  under Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
anti-retaliation provisions, the statutory language, which does not formally 
define “whistleblower,” also does not require reporting-out to the SEC.98 
However, Sarbanes-Oxley covers only employees of public companies and 
companies required to file reports with the SEC by section 15(d) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.99 Among other issuers of securities, 
section 15(d) applies to issuers of mutual fund shares that may be sold to 
the public.100 Given the structure of mutual funds, a question freighted with 
implications for the effectiveness of internal compliance is whether an 
“employee” for this purpose includes an individual employed, not by the 
reporting fund itself (which typically may have no employees),101 but by 
the investment adviser that manages and markets the fund. In Lawson v. 
FMR LLC, 102  the First Circuit treated the question as one of first 
impression in 2012, holding that Sarbanes-Oxley’s protections did not 
extend to employees of firms that contract with public or reporting 
                                                                                                                                       
_Circuit_Cuts_Employers_Out_of_Whistleblower_Loop (quoting statement by plaintiff’s lawyer 
that “‘[t]he court’s decision makes it very clear that an employee who uncovers serious 
wrongdoing of this type has very little protection from retaliation if that wrongdoing is not 
reported to the SEC’”). 
 94. William McLucas et al., Dispatches from the Whistleblower Front: Five Common Pitfalls 
to Avoid, 45 BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1345, 1348 (2013) (reporting 2012 study by Ethics 
Resources Center which found that eighteen percent of reporters choose to report externally, and 
of those, eighty-four percent did so following attempt to report internally). 
 95. See Yin Wilczek, Employers Seize on Fifth Circuit Decision to Ask for Dismissal of 
WhistleBlower Cases, 45 BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1597, 1597–98 (2013) (quoting lawyer who 
represents whistleblowers, who commented, “In a way, the decision does a service to 
whistleblowers by giving them a legitimate reason to file with the SEC even as they provide 
information internally” and observing that an employer’s attempts to discourage employee 
contacts with the SEC could be seen as an attempt to interfere with Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliatory 
protections). 
 96. Sarbanes-Oxley limits monetary remedies to back pay, see 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, while 
Dodd-Frank permits an award of two times back pay, see 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C).  
 97. The statute of limitations under Sarbanes-Oxley, see 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D) (between 
180 days after violation occurs and 180 days after employer becomes aware of it), is relatively 
shorter than the three- to ten-year limitations period under Dodd-Frank, see 15 U.S.C. § 
78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii). Additionally, a claim under Sarbanes-Oxley must be filed first with the 
Secretary of Labor. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1). 
 98. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C). 
 99. Id. § 1514A(a). 
 100. Id. 
 101. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2299, 2305 
(2011) (noting that mutual fund’s adviser provided all management and administrative services 
necessary for fund’s operation, which included drafting statements in prospectus at issue in case). 
 102. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 670 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2387 (2013) 
(No. 12-3).  
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companies.103 The court noted that Congress itself could have expressly 
encompassed employees of mutual-fund advisors or other contractors but 
did not do so.104 The allegedly retaliatory terminations in Lawson occurred 
prior to the enactment of Dodd-Frank; had they occurred after 
Dodd-Frank’s effective date, recall that its anti-retaliatory protections have 
been held to apply only to those who report-out to the SEC, bypassing or 
delaying any internal reporting whether to a compliance officer or 
otherwise.105 
Overall, it is hard to resist the conclusion that, viewed in retrospect, 
these statutory protections against retaliation do not appear to be optimally 
crafted to strengthen internal compliance systems. The Dodd-Frank 
protection is cast in statutory language open to the interpretation that an 
employee is unprotected against retaliation unless the employee reports-out 
to the SEC, not only (or at all) through internal compliance systems.106 The 
protection in Sarbanes-Oxley does not contain this limitation, but it has 
been held not to apply to the most likely sources of relevant information 
within the typical mutual fund, who would be the employees of the fund’s 
investment adviser, charged as the adviser is with managing and marketing 
the fund.107 And Sullivan illustrates the perils of employee-at-will status for 
CCOs, and for others who may report-up compliance-relevant information, 
in a prominent jurisdiction for financial-services firms.108 
C. THE CCO AS A “SUPERVISOR” WITHIN FEDERAL  
SECURITIES REGULATION 
As noted above, one basis on which the SEC may institute 
administrative proceedings is that the respondent failed reasonably to 
supervise a person who committed underlying violations of the federal 
securities laws.109 Whether a person in an advisory and support role who is 
not directly involved in operating a business—such as a CCO—should be 
characterized as a supervisor is not a question that the SEC has addressed 
through a general rule. In Urban, 110  a 2010 decision finding a 
broker-dealer’s CCO/General Counsel to have been the supervisor of a 
broker, the administrative law judge (ALJ) relied on the facts that the 
                                                                                                                                       
 103. Id. at 68. This interpretation of the statute appears to exclude from its protection external 
lawyers who advise public companies on securities-law issues as well as employees of auditing 
firms with public-company clients, inconsistently with Congress’s intent. See Brief of United 
States as Amicus Curiae, Lawson v. FMR, LLC, 2013 WL 4049264 (U.S. Aug. 7, 2013).   
 104. Lawson, 670 F.3d at 76.   
 105. See supra notes 86–104 and accompanying text. 
 106. See supra notes 86–104 and accompanying text. 
 107. See supra notes 101–104 and accompanying text. 
 108. See supra notes 70–87 and accompanying text. 
 109. See supra text accompanying notes 27–28 (describing allegations in Cohen). 
 110. Urban, Initial Decision Release No. 402, 99 SEC Docket 32157 (ALJ Sept. 8, 2010) 
[hereinafter Urban], available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/aljdec/2010/id402bpm.pdf.   
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CCO’s opinions on legal and compliance issues were viewed as 
authoritative within the firm and were generally followed by personnel in 
its business units.111 Although the CCO did not direct the firm’s response 
to the broker in question, he served on the firm’s credit committee and dealt 
with the broker on its behalf.112 The ALJ additionally found that the CCO 
discharged his duty reasonably to supervise the broker. On appeal, the 
Commission itself dismissed the proceeding against the CCO but with no 
substantive ruling; three Commissioners did not participate, and, under the 
SEC’s rules, an initial decision is of no effect when “a majority of 
participating Commissioners do not agree to a disposition on the merits.”113 
Reading through the extensive findings of fact in Urban, one 
sympathizes both with the plight of the CCO and the frustration of the 
SEC’s enforcement staff, confronted as both were by a firm with business 
management unwilling to jettison a productive but highly problematic 
broker. The miscreant broker in Urban divided his efforts between two 
geographically separate offices of the firm and between retail and 
institutional clients.114 A known protégé of the firm’s head of private client 
accounts, the broker was not adequately supervised by the branch managers 
assigned to him, and many within the firm believed that only the head of 
private client accounts or a branch manager going through him had power 
to direct the broker’s conduct or terminate his employment. 115 
Additionally, the head of private client accounts frequently expressed 
hostility toward compliance personnel and programs. 116  The CCO 
intervened when red flags indicated that the broker had engaged in 
improper conduct, which triggered investigations by other compliance 
personnel.117 On behalf of the firm’s credit committee, the CCO acted 
when customer accounts controlled by the broker became over-margined.118 
He also recommended that the head of private client accounts take on direct 
supervision of the broker.119 The head of private client accounts failed to 
do so despite assuring CCO that he would assume special supervision over 
the broker.120 The broker’s transgressions continued.121 Although the CCO 
                                                                                                                                       
 111. Id. One exception noted by the ALJ was the firm’s Retail Sales unit. See id. at 52.  
 112. See id. at 52. 
 113. Urban, Exchange Act Release No. 66,259, Advisers Act Release No. 3366, 102 SEC 
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DISGORGEMENT PLANS § 411(f), at 67 (2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/about 
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 114. Urban, supra note 110, at 4–5. 
 115. Id. at 7. 
 116. Id. at 4. 
 117. Id. at 11. 
 118. Id. at 11–13. 
 119. Id. at 27. 
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 121. Id. at 30–31. 
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recommended that the firm fire the broker, he did not share this 
recommendation with the firm’s board or CEO because he thought doing so 
would be futile given the CEO’s deference to the head of private client 
accounts.122 Following customer complaints, employment terminated for 
both the broker and the CCO—for the CCO because the CEO had lost 
confidence in him when the CEO realized the CCO had left him 
uninformed about the CCO’s recommendation that the broker be fired.123 
The CCO’s forced resignation deprived him of the opportunity to 
participate as an equity holder when the firm was sold to a larger 
financial-services firm.124 His ordeal continued until the SEC, as noted 
above, dismissed the proceeding.125 
One potentially troubling implication of Urban is the evident risk to a 
CCO who intervenes, but without success, in response to indicia of 
wrongdoing. If through more active engagement a CCO may be 
characterized as a “supervisor,” some CCOs may conclude that a more 
passive or hands-off stance is preferable to defending the reasonableness of 
their actions as a respondent in proceedings before the SEC. The SEC’s 
leading precedent, Gutfreund, states a general and fact-sensitive test for 
whether an individual is a “supervisor”: “whether, under the facts and 
circumstances of a particular case, that person has a requisite degree of 
responsibility, ability or authority to affect the conduct of the employee 
whose behavior is at issue.” 126  Focusing specifically on compliance 
personnel and internal lawyers, Gutfreund states that “persons occupying 
positions in the legal or compliance departments of broker-dealers have 
been found by the Commission to be ‘supervisors’ . . . under certain 
circumstances.” 127  The ALJ in Urban found Gutfreund readily 
distinguishable on its facts; in Gutfreund the firm’s general counsel, to 
whom the CCO reported, was informed by senior management that an 
employee had committed a federal crime by submitting a false bid in an 
auction for U.S. Treasury securities in an attempt to corner the market.128 
The general counsel was part of senior management’s collective effort to 
                                                                                                                                       
 122. Id. at 28. 
 123. Id. at 32. 
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 125. The high quality of Mr. Urban’s defense has been applauded without addressing whether 
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78 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 8 
address the problem, which proved to be grossly ineffective.129 In Urban, 
in contrast, many of the firm’s business leaders either lied to the CCO or 
withheld information from him, excluding him from any collective that 
might have worked together to deal with the crisis presented by the 
misbehaving broker. In short, despite relatively weak facts of culpability by 
the CCO, the Urban proceedings illustrate multi-faceted risks for a CCO, 
which include proceeding in a setting in which senior colleagues in the firm 
withhold or misrepresent information, jeopardizing employment, and 
hazarding a defense in a later SEC proceeding.    
CONCLUSION: INCENTIVES TO ENHANCE REPUTATION BY 
STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE 
The narratives recounted in this Article suggest that enhancing the 
effectiveness of CCOs and the compliance systems for which they are 
responsible requires as a fundamental matter that internal compliance 
become a more visible focus for concern. However, the potential of strong 
internal compliance to enhance a firm’s reputation—and to mitigate the risk 
of penalties in the wake of a major compliance failure—does not seem 
likely by itself to lead to improvement. The episodes in this Article suggest, 
instead, that changes in law, regulation, and industry-level practices are 
crucial. More specifically, federal legislation could define “supervisor” for 
purposes of failure-to-supervise liability (as could the SEC). Legislation in 
New York could oust Sullivan and insulate CCOs from the risk of 
termination without good cause, as presumably could federal legislation by 
preempting the state common-law of employment as applicable to CCOs 
within financial services firms that are subject to federal regulation. 
Congress could also redraft the relevant language in Dodd-Frank to clarify 
that reporting-out to the SEC is not a precondition for protection from an 
employer’s retaliation when an employee reports-up within an organization 
information that the employee reasonably believes to be indicative of a 
violation of federal securities law. And Congress could also clarify the 
application of Sarbanes-Oxley’s protection against employment retaliation 
when the employee in question works for an adviser to a mutual fund. 
Formal legislative (and regulatory) solutions aside, compliance 
professionals themselves might consider potential reform strategies. In light 
of Sullivan, and given the prominence of New York for financial-services 
firms, contractual solutions might be promising. Employment contracts may 
of course modify or replace the default rule of employment-at-will by 
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requiring cause to terminate employment, defining cause, and providing for 
severance payments in the event of non-cause termination. Contractual 
provisions requiring that an employer advance attorney’s fees in the event 
of litigation (including a SEC proceeding) that follows a not-for-cause 
termination could also reduce risk to a CCO. 
Further maturation in the compliance professions would also strengthen 
the quality of internal compliance systems and the individuals responsible 
for their operation, including their capacity to exercise independent 
judgment and to resist internal threats to the effectiveness of the systems for 
which they are responsible. A self-regulatory organization could bring 
several benefits, including a vantage point from which to express 
professional disapproval of sub-optimal performance by compliance 
personnel, as well of retaliatory firings of CCOs and other compliance 
professionals. A code of conduct for compliance professionals, articulated 
by a self-regulatory organization, could undergird the exercise of 
independent judgment, an effect enhanced for members of a licensed 
profession (like lawyers) who risk the loss of the license if they fail to fulfill 
their professional duties.130 Additionally, the professional obligations of 
CCOs and other compliance officers who are licensed as lawyers have long 
been murky; clarifying the obligations they owe as licensed professionals is 
likely to prompt a clearer articulation of obligations owed by compliance 
personnel more generally.    
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